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“One Minute to Midnight (English Edition)”，作者：[Michael Dobbs]

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In October 1962, at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear conflict over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. In thishour-by-hour chronicle of those tense days, veteran Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs reveals just how close we came to Armageddon.

Here, for the first time, are gripping accounts of Khrushchev's plan to destroy the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo; the handling of Soviet nuclear warheads on Cuba; and the extraordinary story of a U-2 spy plane that got lost over Russia at the peak of the crisis.

Written like a thriller, One Minute to Midnight is an exhaustively researched account of what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called “the most dangerous moment in human history,” and the definitive book on the Cuban missile crisis.

纸书页数

450页
语言

英语
出版社

Vintage
出版日期

2008年6月3日
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6533 KB
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"Mesmerising stuff ... a riveting hour-by-hour account of one day that could have changed the history of humanity" (Joanna Bourke The Times)

"[Dobbs] has made extensive use of untapped archive material to reveal the secrets of the cloak-and-dagger operations behind the nuclear stand-off in the Caribbean... Excellent" (John Crossland Daily Mail)

"A book with sobering new information . . . as well as contemporary relevance . . . filled with insights that will change the views of experts" (Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to the UN New York Times Book Review)

"Dobb's hour-by-hour overview is a worthy study of this much mythologised fortnight . . . Dobb's chronological approach not only provides a natural sense of pace, but also allows him to illustrate the near-fatal time lag in communication between the two sides" (Time Out)

"In this compelling - and thrilling - new study by Michael Dobbs, there is much new material that forces us to revise our assumptions about the crisis... This is the first book about the crisis to tell the story of the tactical cruise missiles and the first to contain interviews with Soviet veterans. Dobbs adopts a cinematic style, cross-cutting between locations and time zones, and perfectly judges the acceleration of pace in the second half of the book which concentrates on Black Sunday. Unlike previous writers, Dobbs gives due prominence to the subplots, any one of which might have sparked mass destruction" (Christopher Silvester Daily Express) --此文字指其他 kindle_edition 版本。

作者简介

Michael Dobbs is a reporter for the Washington Post, who devoted much of his journalistic career to covering the collapse of communism. He was the Post's bureau chief in Warsaw (1980-82), Paris (1983-86) and Moscow (1988-1993). He has held fellowships at Harvard and Princeton University and is the author of three books: Down with Big Brother (1996), Madeleine Albright (1999) and Saboteurs (2004). Down with Big Brother was a runner-up for the 1997 PEN award for non-fiction. --此文字指其他 kindle_edition 版本。

文摘

Americans

Tuesday, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s chief photo interpreter hovered over the president’s shoulder. Arthur Lundahl held a pointer in his hand, ready to reveal a secret that would bring the world to the edge of nuclear war.

The secret was buried in three black-and-white photographs pasted to briefing boards hidden in a large black case. The photographs had been shot from directly overhead, evidently from a considerable distance, with the aid of a very powerful zoom lens. On superficial inspection, the grainy images of fields, forests, and winding country roads seemed innocuous, almost bucolic. One of the fields contained tubelike objects, others oval-shaped white dots neatly lined up next to one another. John F. Kennedy would later remark that the site could be mistaken for “a football field.” After examining the photographs earlier that morning, his brother Bobby had been unable to make out anything more than “the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house.”

To help the president understand the significance of the photos, Lundahl had labeled them with arrows pointing to the dots and blotches, along with captions reading “ERECTOR LAUNCHER EQUIPMENT,” “MISSILE TRAILERS,” and “TENT AREAS.” He was about to display the briefing boards when there was a commotion outside the door. A four-year-old girl burst into one of the most heavily guarded rooms in the White House.

The heads of the fourteen most powerful men in the United States swiveled to the doorway as Caroline Kennedy ran toward her father, babbling excitedly: “Daddy, daddy, they won’t let my friend in.”

The somber-looking men in dark suits were used to such intrusions. Their frowns dissolved into smiles as the president got up from his leather-upholstered seat and led his daughter back toward the door of the Cabinet Room.

“Caroline, have you been eating candy?”

No reply. The president smiled.

“Answer me. Yes, no, or maybe.”

Father and daughter disappeared for a few seconds, his arm draped around her shoulders. When Kennedy returned, his expression had again become grave. He took his place at the center of the long table beneath the presidential seal, his back to the Rose Garden. He was flanked on either side by his secretary of state and secretary of defense. Facing him across the table were his brother, his vice president, and his national security adviser. Behind them stood a small bronze bust of Abraham Lincoln, flanked by some model sailing ships. Above the fireplace to the right was the celebrated Gilbert Stuart portrait of a powdered and bewigged George Washington.

The thirty-fifth president of the United States called the meeting to order.

Kennedy seemed preternaturally calm to the other men in the room as he listened to the evidence of Kremlin duplicity. In secrecy, while insisting they would never contemplate such a thing, the Soviet leaders had installed surface-to-surface nuclear missiles on Cuba, less than a hundred miles from American shores. According to the CIA, the missiles had a range of 1,174 miles and were capable of hitting much of the eastern seaboard. Once armed and ready to fire, they could explode over Washington in thirteen minutes, turning the capital into a scorched wasteland.

Lundahl took the briefing boards out of his bag and laid them on the table. He used his pointer to direct the president’s attention to a canvas-covered missile trailer next to a launcher erector. Seven more missile trailers were parked in a nearby field.

“How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?” asked the president. His voice was clipped and tense, betraying a boiling anger beneath the calm.

“The length, sir.”

“The what? The length?”

“The length of it, yes.”

CIA experts had spent the last thirty-six hours poring over thousands of reconnaissance photographs of the hills and valleys of western Cuba. They had discovered telltale cables connecting one of the tubelike objects to the nearby oval-shaped splotch, and had used a revolutionary new computer device that filled up half a room—the Mann Model 621 comparator—to measure its length. The tubes turned out to be sixty-seven feet long. Missiles of identical length had been photographed at military parades in Red Square in Moscow.

The president asked the obvious question: when would the missiles be ready to fire?

The experts were unsure. That would depend on how soon the missiles could be mated with their nuclear warheads. Once mated, they could be fired in a couple of hours. So far, there was no evidence to suggest that the Soviets had moved the warheads to the missile sites. If the warheads were present, one would expect to see some kind of secure storage facility at the missile sites, but nothing was visible.

“There is some reason to believe the warheads aren’t present and hence they are not ready to fire,” said Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. The computerlike brain of the former head of the Ford Motor Company clicked away furiously, calculating the chances of a surprise attack. He believed the president still had some time.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. General Maxwell Taylor had parachuted into Normandy during World War II, and had commanded Allied forces in Berlin and Korea. It fell to him to point out the risks of delay. The Soviets could be in a position to fire their missiles “very quickly.” Most of the infrastructure was already in place. “It’s not a question of waiting for extensive concrete pads and that sort of thing.”

The president’s advisers were already dividing into doves and hawks.

Kennedy had received an initial intelligence briefing earlier that morning. His national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, had knocked on the door of his bedroom, on the second floor of the White House, shortly after 8:00 a.m. The president was propped up in bed, in pajamas and dressing gown, reading the morning newspapers. As often happened, he was annoyed by a page-one headline in The New York Times. On this particular morning, his exasperation was directed at his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had broken the unwritten convention of former presidents refraining from publicly criticizing the current occupant of the Oval Office.

EISENHOWER CALLS PRESIDENT WEAK ON FOREIGN POLICY

—

Denounces “Dreary Record,” Challenging Statements by Kennedy on Achievements

—

HE SEES SETBACK TO U.S.

As Bundy described the latest U-2 mission over Cuba, Kennedy’s irritation with Ike was replaced by a burning anger toward his Cold War nemesis. Over the past two years, he and Nikita Khrushchev had been engaged in a very public game of nuclear oneupmanship. But Kennedy thought he had an understanding with the mercurial Soviet premier. Khrushchev had sent word through intermediaries that he would do nothing to embarrass the U.S. president politically before the midterm congressional elections, which were exactly three weeks away.

News that the Soviets were constructing missile bases on Cuba could hardly have come at a worse time. During the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy had used Cuba as a stick to beat the Republicans, accusing the Eisenhower government of doing nothing to prevent Fidel Castro from transforming the island into “a hostile and militant Communist satellite.” Now that the Democrats were in power, the political roles were reversed. Republican politicians were seizing on reports of a Soviet military buildup on Cuba to denounce Kennedy for weakness and fecklessness. Just two days earlier, Kennedy had sent Bundy out on nationwide television to knock down a claim by the Republican senator from New York, Kenneth B. Keating, that the Soviets would soon be able “to hurl rockets into the American heartland” from their Caribbean outpost.

Kennedy’s immediate reaction on learning from Bundy that Khrushchev had double-crossed him was to sputter, “He can’t do this to me.” An hour later, he walked into the office of his appointments secretary, Kenny O’Donnell, and announced glumly, “Ken Keating will probably be the next president of the United States.”

Determined to keep the information secret as long as possible, Kennedy decided to stick to his regular schedule, acting as if nothing was amiss. He showed off Caroline’s pony Macaroni to the family of a returning astronaut, chatted amiably for half an hour with a Democratic congressman, and presided over a conference on mental retardation. It was not until nearly noon that he managed to break away from his ceremonial duties and meet with his top foreign policy advisers.

Kennedy conceded that he was mystified by Khrushchev. Alternately ingratiating and boorish, friendly and intimidating, the metalworker turned superpower leader was unlike any other politician he had ever encountered. Their single summit meeting—in Vienna, in June 1961—had been a brutal experience for Kennedy. Khrushchev had treated him like a little boy, lecturing him on American misdeeds, threatening to take over West Berlin, and boasting about the inevitable triumph of communism. Most shocking of all, Khrushchev did not seem to share his alarm about the risks of nuclear war, and how it could be triggered by miscalculations on either side. He spoke about nuclear weapons in a casual, offhand kind of way, as simply one more element in the superpower competition. If the United States wants war, he blustered, “let it begin now.”

“Roughest thing in my life,” Kennedy had told James Reston of The New York Times, after it was all over. “He just beat the hell out of m... --此文字指其他 kindle_edition 版本。

基本信息

ASIN ‏ : ‎ B0018QOYWA
出版社 ‏ : ‎ Vintage (2008年6月3日)
出版日期 ‏ : ‎ 2008年6月3日
语言 ‏ : ‎ 英语
文件大小 ‏ : ‎ 6533 KB
标准语音朗读 ‏ : ‎ 已启用
X-Ray ‏ : ‎ 已启用
生词提示功能 ‏ : ‎ 已启用
纸书页数 ‏ : ‎ 450页

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Richard of Connecticut

A Riveting Blow by Blow Description of the Events that were Leading Up to NUCLEAR WAR - Five Stars

2010年12月4日 - 已在美国亚马逊上发表

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This book reads like a novel. It is more exciting than any novel can be because it is based on truth and a story so frightening that it compels you to read it through to the last page, and so you must. Every page has detailed information, much of which is new, and the plots and subplots reel you in for the ride of a book reader's lifetime. I promise you that you won't put this one down.

The story of this book is familiar to all that are alive. In the fall of 1962, the leadership of the Soviet Union with the complicity of Fidel Castro decided to secretly install offensive nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. They were successful until U-2 over flights of Cuba in October produced detailed photographic evidence of the Soviet plan.

The details of the story have been in conflict for almost 50 years as different authors have molded the story to fit their opinions. If you read Harvard historians, John Kennedy (JFK) comes out very much the hero. Other authors have different slants. It is my contention that Michael Dobbs in One Minute to Midnight has come the closest to the historical truth that we are going to see for many years.

The MECHANICS of the Book

Dobbs has decided to write the book in a chronological sequence during the 13 day sequence of what is now called the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is a chilling minute by minute account. This is neither a memoir, nor what would be termed a scholarly study. Dobbs has attempted to humanize the story, and show the people involved on both sides. It is perhaps true that the human side of this story has never been told, and certainly not to the extent you are witnessing here.

As the 13 days progresses, more and more space is devoted to the events of each day. Thus only a chapter is devoted to the first day of the crisis. A great deal of space is devoted to October 27, 1962, which is now known as Black Saturday in the Kennedy White House. During that day, Fidel Castro sent a telegram to Nikita Khrushchev enthusiastically pushing the Russian Premier to unleash the Soviet arsenal against America.

By the end of that day, JFK and the Russian Premier would come to terms in a deal that would give up American missiles in Turkey for the dismantling of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. What happened during the 13 days is absolutely spellbinding, and is perhaps the most important event to happen in human history. War with the USSR would have meant the nuclear destruction of all mankind. Those that did not perish immediately would have died along with most of civilization from the resultant fallout which would have lasted for years. The question we should all ask ourselves is what were they thinking?

Here are just a few of the things you will learn from this incredibly well written and vital book:

* Unbeknownst to the United States the Soviet Union had brought tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba. They were prepared to use them against an American invasion force. This means that one weapon could easily wipe out 15,000 to 30,000 American soldiers. At least one such weapon was within 15 miles of America's Guantanamo Bay naval base,and positioned for use.

* Certain Russian submarines were equipped with nuclear tipped torpedoes. One torpedo could wipe out an American aircraft carrier or even most of the fleet accompanying a carrier. One such Russian sub was forced to surface due to American depth charges. The Russian captain could have used his weapons and unleashed a nuclear exchange.

* Dobbs is probably the first writer to actually inspect the hundreds of cans of raw photographic footage that has been declassified. Some of this footage is in conflict with the memories of some of the participants of the crisis and Dobbs goes through the discrepancies.

* It is now deemed to be archaic to believe that there was no direct communications link between the White House and the Soviet Union. At times it took as long as 18 hours for JFK to dictate a communication and for it to be delivered to Khrushchev and translated into Russian.

* Diplomats in the Russian Embassy in Washington had to send a telegram by calling for a bicycle messenger when communicating with Moscow.

* Our naval ships in the waters off Cuba sometimes required hours to decipher orders from Washington.

What pours through this book is the overriding notion that at any time small events had the capability of ballooning up into a major crisis that by itself would trigger a total nuclear exchange. The Joint Chiefs were constantly edging towards invasion and war. JFK was successful in holding them back but knew that at some point, he might lose control over the situation, and events. The same was true for Khrushchev.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has been war gamed hundreds of times, and more often than not the result has been WAR. In the early 1990's a series of joint conferences were held with participants from Russia, Cuba, and America attending to find out what they could about the crisis.

During an early conference it became public that there were scores of Russian missiles already active in Cuba that the US did not know about. They were under local control of the Soviet army technical missile crews. This means that if the US had invaded Cuba it is understood that these crews would have launched their missiles at America causing a full retaliatory response by the US against Russia's homeland. The unthinkable would have become reality.

CONCLUSION:

If you have a love for history that is extraordinary in a book that is about as interesting as anything you will ever read than pick up a copy of One Minute to Midnight, and be prepared to be mesmerized. Just start on it early in the day because you might not want to go to sleep that night. Thank you for reading this review.

Richard C. Stoyeck

My Own THOUGHT:

I would like to leave you with this thought that has troubled me for years. I have discussed it with history professors at Harvard who are fully conversant with the crisis. None have ever given me anything but stares, so perhaps you can give it a try.

Why when JFK first became alert to the installation of the weapons did he NOT CONFRONT Khrushchev privately and demand the removal or else war? By confronting the Premier publicly he boxed Khrushchev into a corner which humiliated the Russian leader and could have easily led to war. Our weapons throughout this period were overwhelming. It simply makes no sense given the historical circumstances. Have a great read.

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Robert

Very good read

2023年1月17日 - 已在美国亚马逊上发表

已确认购买

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book. I was in the 7th grade when these events took place, and had no idea that we were on the brink of nuclear apocalypse. I knew it was a serious event, but not to that degree. Very good retelling of an overlooked historical event.

Daryl Carpenter

Compelling, but not QUITE as good as I remember it

2022年6月13日 - 已在美国亚马逊上发表

已确认购买

The old saying "you'll never believe how close we REALLY came!" might seem like a tired old cliche, but after re-reading "One Minute to Midnight," it's kind of a miracle I'm not scrawling this review in the dirt while gnawing on a dead rat. Michael Dobbs presents the Cuban Missile Crisis as a series of communications failures and poor decisions, compounded by the fact that almost everyone involved is either incredibly naive, dangerously hotheaded, or has a childishly simplistic idea of a "winnable" nuclear war. Thankfully, two of the three leaders named in the subtitle didn't exactly relish the idea of nuclear annihilation.

While "One Midnight to Midnight" is undeniably a compelling read, and for the most part, it's quite well written, it's not quite the edge-of-your-seat thriller I remembered it being when I devoured it back in 2008. Much of what was new and groundbreaking upon publication, such as the U-2 flight which drifted over the Soviet Union, the Soviet submarine which was minutes from firing a nuclear torpedo at American warships, and the fact that the Russians had dozens of tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons on the island, have all become common knowledge over the last 15 years. I suppose if you've never read any books on the crisis, or at least not any recent ones, some of the "new" revelations might be shocking. The rest of us will just nod our heads and say "yup, things really DID get that bad!"

Familiarity aside, I still strongly recommend this book to anyone looking for a recounting of the crisis that focuses mainly on the political and military side of things, which presents all of the main characters as flawed without demonizing any of them. I'd recommend buying a physical copy instead of the Kindle edition. The photo reproduction in the Kindle isn't that great, and there are gaps, sometimes several lines long, between each paragraph, something I don't remember in the original hardcover.

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