- 出版社: Yale University Press (2013年5月14日)
- 精装: 304页
- 语种： 英语
- ISBN: 0300190522
- 条形码: 9780300190526
- 商品尺寸: 16.6 x 3.1 x 24.1 cm
- 商品重量: 671 g
- 品牌: Yale University Press
- ASIN: 0300190522
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- 第72位 - 图书 > 进口原版书 > Politics & Social Sciences（政治与社会科学） > Politics & Government（政治与政府） > Public Affairs & Policy > Economic Policy
- 第74位 - 图书 > 进口原版书 > Business & Money（商业与财富） > Economics（经济学） > Economic Policy & Development
When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence (英语) 精装 – 2013年5月14日
"A thoughtful and convincing assessment of what happens when the rich world becomes over-accustomed to rising standards of living but cannot afford the benefits its governments have promised, by the chief-economist at HSBC. Serious scaremongering; worthy of Stephen King's horror-writing namesake."-The Economist, (named a 2013 Book of the Year) * The Economist * "When the Money Runs Out sets out well the problems facing advanced economies." -David Smith, The Sunday Times -- David Smith * The Sunday Times * "[King] is dabbling in the financial equivalent of the horror genre. Perhaps even scarier, his is the stuff of nonfiction."-Michael J. Casey, The Wall Street Journal -- Michael J. Casey * The Wall Street Journal * "The author has tightly reasoned arguments. . . and suggestions for the steps that should be taken to ensure economic stability for future generations."-Library Journal * Library Journal * "In this book, HSBC's chief economist describes a real-life economic horror story, picking over the bones of the global financial crisis with the professional detachment of a forensic scientist examining the scene of a crime. The conclusions are clear and compelling. By the end, we know whodunit, how it was done and why, without resort to economic jargon - there are few acronyms, no equations and no charts. Instead we are offered policy prescriptions that ring true - uncomfortably so . . . The book should appeal to a wider audience than economists. The author is a newspaper columnist as well as a professional economist, and it shows in the crisp and easy style of his prose. I recommend it heartily."-Erik Britton, Management Today -- Erik Britton * Management Today * "Stephen King, chief economist at HSBC, has just published an interesting and well-written book When the Money Runs Out."-Paul Ormerod, City AM -- Paul Ormerod * City am * "The book is jammed full of history [...] and is highly readable - being rich in the economic history that he argues was lacking in pre-crisis economic analysis. It is accompanied by some wonderful anecdotes and provides a good mix of economics and politics in addition to its historical detail."-George Buckley, Financial World -- George Buckley * Financial World * "A 'powerful' and 'convincing' book. Overall, as Charles Moore notes in The Daily Telegraph, 'it's alarmingly difficult to disagree' with this book."-Matthew Partridge, Money Week. -- Matthew Partridge * Money Week * "For many, the financial crisis is a temporary interruption in the rise of western prosperity that is due to easily remedied policy mistakes. The Keynesians believe this, as do anti-Keynesians on the free-market right. King argues, instead, that the future is not what it used to be. We have made promises to ourselves we cannot afford to keep. The argument is important, even if, like me, you are not persuaded." -Martin Wolf, Financial Times. -- Martin Wolf * Financial Times * "Well-written, thoughtful and highly convincing. . . . [King's] clear-eyed assessment of the problems ahead makes the book essential reading."-The Economist * The Economist *
Stephen D. King is Group Chief Economist and Global Head of Economics and Asset Allocation research at HSBC. He lives in London.
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In the West, persistent progress is most often perceived as a given. This West's economic tenet was best reflected in the beliefs of persistent increases in asset prices relative to the size of economies before 2007-2008. These beliefs went hand in hand with substantial increases in debt during this period (pp. 62-63; 66-67; 130-131; 134-135; 139). However, many of the factors behind the continuous increase in Western living standards in the second half of the 20th century seem to be one-offs. Think for example about healthcare, social security systems, world trade, financial innovation, quality of education, the further increase in women's labor participation, or the sharp decline in back-breaking housework (pp. 11-13).
Growth in most of the Western industrialized world has been anemic since the beginning of the 21st century. Mr. King identifies four key drivers behind this underwhelming performance:
1) The negative effects of the success of emerging nations on Western growth;
2) The over-investment in the U.S. housing market in the 2000s after the collapse of the 1990s technological revolution in 2000;
3) The financial crisis of 2007-2008;
4) The arrogance of Western policy-makers who thought after the last-named crisis that they were smarter than their Japanese counterparts. Their collective underperformance is especially striking compared to the performance of their Asian counterparts in the aftermath of the late 1990s Asian crisis (pp. 28-34; 58; 67; 192-204; 209).
Like too many of their Western alter egos, the U.S. central bankers alongside politicians suffer from what Mr. King calls a collective delusional `optimism bias' (p. 89). Year after year, they claim they have unlocked the secrets of future economic success, but ultimately fail to deliver on their forecasts. Quantitative easing and other associated macroeconomic quick fixes redistribute the spoils of past economic success and failure rather than kick start a real recovery (pp. 67-68; 71-77; 79-84; 89-90; 115; 118-120; 181; 218).
Furthermore, these quick fixes undermine the trust that people have to have in each other and their public and private institutions for powering economic growth (pp. 147; 149). As trust in institutions shrinks, the gap between our entitlements and our new, stagnant economic reality is widening under the pressure of income inequality, the ageing of the population, and the declining trust between (foreign) creditors and debtors (pp. 54; 158-177; 217-221; 243-245).
Like most Western countries, the U.S. has not shown a willingness to accept a temporary, sudden loss in living standards as an inevitable consequence of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. An obvious sense of entitlement stands in the way between this reduction in living standards and a subsequent real recovery (pp. 178; 204). Neither austerity nor stimulus can solve this conundrum without much hard work and considerable self-sacrifice (pp. 67; 205-206; 211; 220; 238).
The widespread lack of trust and the sub-par economic growth that most of the Western industrialized world is experiencing, have far-reaching consequences:
1) Entrepreneurial spirit evaporates, replaced by a battle for the spoils driven by a culture of entitlement that pervades the public and private sectors, healthcare, or the elderly;
2) Infrastructure projects get further slashed because they benefit future rather than current voters;
3) In the absence of a concomitant rise in prosperity, reforms are too often perceived as a zero-sum game and therefore opposed;
4) Lack of sustained economic growth leads to ever-increasing social fracturing, resulting in more racism, sexism, and other undesirable `-isms' (pp. 40-43; 48; 50; 149; 181; 226-229).
Mr. King makes a number of recommendations to tackle the structural problems that threaten all our economic futures:
1) Force rating agencies to issue a judgment on not only those who issue debt, but also those who acquire it;
2) Vote for a fiscal union that would go hand in hand with a monetary union in the Eurozone;
3) Establish a government's process that would automatically reduce the deficit year by year with an automatic suspension in years of economic contraction. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 in the U.S. accomplished it during the late 1980s and early 1990s;
4) Introduce a new social contract between the generations. This compact means continued support for education, infrastructure, and children's health, as well as a serious reduction in public spending elsewhere, including a substantial reduction in, say, defense spending and / or social benefits;
5) Implement a monetary policy that focuses on nominal GDP targeting, i.e., a policy that focuses on the rate of growth of nominal activity, not on stabilizing the inflation rate;
6) Encourage labor and capital mobility;
7) Impose macro-prudential rules on banks, treat national branches of international banks as subsidiaries, and stop the cross-subsidization of services;
8) Encourage education about the financial world (pp. 234-235; 237-239; 242; 244-245; 247-250; 256-259).
In summary, Mr. King warns his readers that the current malaise is not a cyclical dip, but a structural challenge that requires a drastic rethinking about our future.
King first looks at how Progress has been taken for Granted and in particular how the very high growth rates for the three decades following the Second World War may have been exception. The period 1945-1975 had the rebuilding of countries that were previously economically strong in Europe and Japan, the arrival of a plethora of new technologies in nuclear power, jet engines, containerisation, computers and a big expansion of the work force due to women entering the formal workforce.
The book then describes the pain of stagnation and looks at Japan since 1990 and Argentina and how everyone in the west believes they should be better off than previous generations and how social security spending has massively increased. In the UK in 1950 it was 4% of GDP but today it is 14% of a much larger GDP. Essentially social spending could easily increase for many years as growth allowed people to get richer and to have more taken by the government. However, with lower growth incomes are growing more slowly than social spending.
King spends the next chapters looking at financial and monetary attempts to fix stagnating economies. He looks at the depression and the responses to it and suggests that Keynesian and monetary manipulation are a bit like drugs, useful for some relief but dangerous when they become to be relied on.
King describes three schisms, income inequality, aging and distrust between creditors and debtors that will affect the ability of economies to grow. He goes further and suggests that economic dissatisfaction will lead to radical politics such as the rise of the far right in Greece. King describes a chaotic dystopia that could result if a slowdown in growth is handled poorly.
Finally King gives recommendations for how to avoid dystopia; he wants a central financial authority in the Eurozone, reductions in government spending, coming up with ways of handling generational conflict and calls for a new monetary framework to be constructed.
The book is dense and full of senior economist's observations of historical crises and their impacts. There is also extensive exposition of major economists' responses to them with a lot of quotation. It would be considerable improved with more graphical exposition of historical trends. King also does not explore multiple solutions to the problems he sees and attempts to unify the problems of Japan, the US and Europe that perhaps have critical differences mean that the responses should be different.