Microeconomic Theory (英语) 精装 – 1995年9月7日
"Clear, comprehensive, and deep! The authors' treatment is both contemporary and probing, covering all aspects of modern microeconomic theory at a level accessible to graduate students, and which goes beyond simple statement of results to underscore the underlying intuition. This text should be a standard for graduate study in microeconomics!"--Lars Stole, University of Chicago "An excellent, comprehensive text."--Michael Jerison, SUNY at Albany "Broader and deeper than any graduate microeconomics textbook I know."--Rajeev Dehejia, Harvard "Outstanding! The choice of topics, coverage, and degree of sophistication is perfect for a first-year graduate theory sequence."--Glenn MacDonald, W.E. Simm Graduate School of Business "Extremely helpful as a teaching aid in a first year graduate theory course. It covers a great deal of material, motivating the material with informal discussion yet presenting it compactly and rigorously, with illuminating diagrams and formal examples. There is also a wealth of interesting homework problems."--Truman F. Bewley, Yale University
PART I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING; Introduction to Part I; 1. Preference and Choice; 2. Consumer Choice; 3. Classical Demand Theory; 4. Aggregate Demand; 5. Production; 6. Choice under Uncertainty; PART II: GAME THEORY; Introduction to Part II; 7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games; 8. Simultaneous-Move Games; 9. Dynamic Games; PART III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE; Introduction to Part III; 10. Competitive Markets; 11. Extrnalities and Public Goods; 12. Market Power; 13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening; 14. The Principal-Agent Problem; PART IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; Introduction to Part IV; 15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples; 16. Equilibrium and its Basic Welfare Properties; 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium; 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria; 19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty; 20. Equilibrium and Time; PART V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES; Introduction to Part V; 21. Social Choice Theory; 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining; 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design; Mathematical Appendix
The scope of the book is very impressive; it's no wonder that it's become the standard graduate-level text in so many universities. In the context of a course taught by a great professor, it's an excellent supplement. Unfortunately, I can't recommend it for self-study. Definitions are sometimes vague; examples fail to illuminate the turgid concepts being outlined; and there are no solutions to the numerous exercises. (A separate solution manual is available online, but it's often unenlightening.)
In short, this book is a boot camp for micro-theorists. It will not hold your hand.
But there is little in the way of serious competition. Kreps' A Course in Microeconomic Theory is often clearer, as is Rubinstein's Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent (also a free download at his website). Both were recommended by a professor as supplements. Neither of them can possibly hope to cover everything that Mas-Colell et al. cover. There is no perfect micro-theory book. For game theory (which this book spends a few middle chapters on), I'd strongly recommend Binmore's lively (though demanding) Playing for Real.